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ABSTRACT
Beginning in the 1970s, graduate assistants have organized labor unions. Presently, 36
universities have a graduate–student union. However, the effect graduate–student unions have
on wages, wage variance, health benefits, and organizational structure is unknown. This study
uses data from the Chronicle of Higher Education and government data to estimate the eco-
nomic effects of unionization. By using a multilevel model is used to control for intra–university
correlation of wages, this study concludes graduate unions are effective at raising stipends, but
ineffective at lowering fees, providing health–care coverage, and lowering intra–university wage
variance.
1CHAPTER 1. INTENT AND MECHANISMS OF UNIONIZATION
While union memberships are declining, graduate–student unions are have become popular.
Even though faculty and staff unions have made unionism more familiar to campuses, graduate
students still do not fit the demographic profile of traditional unionized labor. Graduate
assistants are, for all intent and purposes, temporary employees—leaving their duties after
graduation; young—typically under thirty; and have completed over 16 years of schooling.1
The effects of graduate–student unionization on stipend levels, stipend distributions, health
benefits, and academic success are largely unknown. The paucity of research is largely due
to a lack of systematic reporting of wages, hours worked, fringe benefits, number of strikes,
and other labor management issues regarding graduate–student unions. Notwithstanding, a
number of scholars have argued the potential beneficial and deleterious effects unionization.
This paper will evaluate those arguments against the known empirical data.
One difficulty is to present a framework to view graduate–student unionization. This pa-
per will adopt Richard Freeman and James Medoff’s “two faces of unionism” to the scholarly
literature on graduate–student unions (Chapter 1). This framework will augment the existing
research in two ways: first, it will be easier for researchers to view the larger picture of union-
ization and weight the costs and benefits. Second, it will become evident that the economic
effects of unionization is the largest piece of missing data.
Chapter 2 will fill in the missing gap on graduate–student union research by using a panel
data set assembled from The Chronicle of Higher Education, the U.S. Department of Education,
National Research Council, and the National Science Foundation. The union’s effect on the
union–nonunion wage gap, health benefits, and wage variation will be explored. Chapter 3
1Hirsch et al. (See 2004, Table 5.4) for a description of current unionized workers.
2will use previous research on graduate–student unions, along with the research presented in
Chapter 2, to weigh the costs and benefits from unionization.
Graduate assistants are known under a number of labels: teaching assistants (TAs); re-
search assistants (RAs); and (GAs), which usually includes TAs and RAs. Thus, unions
composed of graduate assistants also have a number of synonyms: graduate–student unions;
graduate–employee unions; and graduate–assistant unions. For reasons that will become clear,
union activists usually denote themselves as graduate–employee unions; however, this paper
will refer to them as graduate–student unions. Unionization itself will generally refer to, unless
otherwise noted, to graduate–student unionization.2
1.1 History of Graduate–Student Unions
The University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Teaching Assistants’ Association (TAA) is gener-
ally regarded as the first graduate–student labor union. Originally an informal union, in 1969
members of the TAA threatened to strike if the Wisconsin state legislature passed a bill that
would revoke out-of-state tuition remission for graduate assistants. The threat worked and the
bill was quickly withdrawn. Following their political success, the TAA began to seek formal
recognition and a labor contract. In the same year, the University of Wisconsin voluntarily rec-
ognized the TAA as a collective bargaining agent and entered contract negotiations. However,
by March 1970, after a year of negotiations, little progress was made in reaching a contract.
The TAA struck and shortly thereafter, the University of Wisconsin and the TAA reached a
deal and signed their first labor contract.
Although the TAA was the first union, it was not the first to receive a contract. In 1968,
the City University of New York (CUNY) included graduate assistants in its union contract
with the faculty—who were already unionized. Following Wisconsin and CUNY, the Michigan,
Oregon, and three Florida public universities—University of Florida, South Florida University,
and Florida Agriculture & Mechanical University—unionized in the 1970s.
Graduate–student unionization developed through two lineages: public universities and
2Although this paper discusses the court cases pertaining to the classification of graduate assistants as
employees, this research does not contribute to the discussion.
3private universities. A bulk of the unionized universities are public institutions. Unionization
eligibility for public universities depends on state law. States with already dense union mem-
bership were often the first to grant union status.3. Private universities, however, were subject
to federal law and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had the authority to approve
or deny bargaining rights.
Initially, the NLRB refused to intervene in the affairs of private, nonprofit universities
(Columbia, 97 NLRB 424 ), but finally asserted jurisdiction over graduate students in private
universities in 1970 (Cornell, 183 NLRB 41, 1970). When teaching assistants at Adelphi
University petitioned for union recognition, (Adelphi, 195 NLRB 30), the NLRB determined
graduate assistants were not employees and may not unionize. In the majority opinion, two
board members summarized the position that would be upheld for the next thirty years:
The graduate assistants are graduate students working toward their own advanced
academic degrees, and their employment depends entirely on their continued status
as such. They do not have faculty rank, are not listed in the University’s catalogs as
faculty members, have no vote at faculty meetings, are not covered by the University
personnel plan, have no standing before the University’s grievance committee, and,
except for health insurance, do not participate in any of the fringe benefits available
to faculty members . . . Unlike faculty members, graduate assistants are unaided,
instructed, assisted, and corrected in their performance of their assistantship duties
by the regular faculty members to whom they are assigned (p. 646).
Medical residents at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center also petitioned for union recognition (Cedars–
Sinai, 223 NLRB 57, 1976). The NLRB, however, echoed the Adelphi decision when the Board
rejected medical residents and interns from unionizing because “[t]hey participate in these
programs not for the purpose of earning a living; instead, they are there to pursue the graduate
medical education that is a requirement for the practice of medicine (p. 253).” Later, even
faculty unions at private universities, who enjoyed earlier success, lost a Supreme Court case
3The first three graduate unions were in states were the density of union membership was higher than the
national average (see Hirsch et al., 2001). Moreover, most of the graduate–student unions are in the Pacific,
West North Central, East North Central, and Middle Atlantic regions—the regions with the most dense union
membership (Hirsch et al., 2004).
4Figure 1.1 Union membership density and number of graduate-student
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and were prohibited from unionizing because faculty members were considered to be managers
instead of employees (NLRB v Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 1980). The Cornell, Adelphi,
Cedars–Sinai, and Yeshiva cases had effectively halted the chance of any successful unionization
attempt at a private university.
Meanwhile, graduate students in public universities, which are governed by state laws and
agencies, were able to continue unionizing since they are not covered by NLRB rulings. The
graduate–student union differs from the overall unionization trend in the United States. Figure
1.1 shows the proportion of U.S. workers who are members of a union has fallen nearly 20
percent since 1944 (Hirsch et al., 2001, 2006). Conversely, the number of organized campuses
has doubled in the last ten years,4 which coincides with the rise in public–sector unionism.5
4Unfortunately, there is no reliable source of union density numbers for graduate assistants.
5See Reder (1988) for a detailed discussion on the bifurcation between private and public section unionism
5Presently, at least 36 universities are unionized.6 A bulk of the graduate–student unionization
occurred during the 1990s, where among other universities, four campuses at State University
of New York (SUNY) and the ten University of California universities organized in 1992 and
1999, respectively.
Although many unions were officially recognized in the 1990s, the drives took as many as
twenty years to come to fruition. To collectively bargain, the university must first recognize
the union as a collective bargaining agent. For instance, the University of California’s drive
begun in the 1980s which eventually led to the recognition of the readers and tutors union at
Berkeley in 1988. A few years later, in 1992, the graduate assistants went on in order to gain
formal recognition by the University of California-Berkeley administration. Again in 1998,
graduate assistants went on strike during fall semester finals to no avail. Berkeley’s graduate–
student union then petitioned the California Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) to be
recognized as a collective bargaining agent. Later that year, PERB ruled graduate assistants
were indeed “employees” and were permitted to unionize. Similarly, even the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, which had initially voluntarily recognized their GA union, revoked its
recognition in 1980 after the Teaching Assistants’ Association struck over matters of educa-
tional policy and institutional governance (Barba, 1994). It was not until 1986 when the
Wisconsin legislature, which oversees bargaining units, recognized the TAA as a formal union.
Despite the NLRB prohibition of unions at private universities, the unionization effort
continued at private, normally prestigious, universities. Unions, which did not have collective
bargaining status, organized at Yale and New York University (NYU). Administratively, non–
contractual unions are equivalent to any other student organization. While universities were not
required to bargain with these unions, the Supreme Court and NLRB decisions did not prevent
universities independently recognizing GA unions. One of the strongest unionization efforts was
the Yale University where the Graduate Employee and Students Organization (GESO) went
on six strikes between 1990 and 2005. A bitter strike came in 1996 when graduate assistants
refused to calculate and submit semester grades for classes they taught (Goldin, 1995; Glenn,
6California State University unionized in 2006, but of CSU’s 23 campuses, it is unclear how any have unionized
graduate assistants.
62005). Administrators continued to refuse to recognize the union and the strike eventually
ended.7
The rapid push for GA unionization at the close of the decade would only get turned
on its head. Relying heavily on the dissent in the aforementioned Adelphi case, the NLRB
began to permit unionization at private institutions. Boston Medical Center case (330 NLRB
30, 1999)—a case involving medical residents petition to unionize—overturned the important
Cedars–Sinai case by shifting their focus on the literal definition of “employee” in the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. 152, Section 2(3)). The definition is very inclusive
and the Board determined that medical residents were employees and, therefore, had the right
to unionize. The spirit of this decision was carried forward when the unionization effort at
NYU was applied to the NLRB. Again, the NLRB reviewed union eligibility under the broad
definition of “employee” and determined graduate students to be eligible for unionization (332
NLRB 111, 2000).
The NYU case seemingly opened the door for other private universities to pursue their own
drives. However, unionization efforts at private universities suffered two setbacks. First, in
2002, a formal campus–wide vote on graduate–student unionization at Cornell was defeated—
the first union drive at a private university to fail (Smallwood, 2002a). Ballots were also
casted at Brown, Columbia, Pennsylvania, and Tufts University, but school administrators
were able to postpone counting as administrations appealed their cases. The NYU ruling,
which gave unionization efforts at private universities a fresh and almost tangible opportunity,
was short–lived. In 2004, administrators at Brown University appealed the union drive to the
NLRB, where the composition of board members significantly changed, overturned the NYU
ruling, thus banning private universities from unionizing (342 NLRB 42, 2004). Since the
Brown ruling, New York University has refused to renew a new unions contract with graduate
assistants (Gravois, 2005).
Table 1.1 shows all of the universities where graduate assistants have unionized. The for-
mation date indicates the year a union first formed; the recognized date is when the university
7Participants claimed NYU threatened them in order to end the strike, but a judge ruled the strike was
unprotected under fair labor laws.
7administration officially recognized the union; and first contract is when the first union con-
tract was ratified by graduate students.8 Since 2000, the University of California and California
State University system signed contracts with their graduate assistants. The Illinois Public
Employee Relations Board has also granted collective bargaining rights to universities, permit-
ting Southern Illinois University, the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Springfield,
and Chicago to unionize.9
1.2 Antecedents of Unionization
1.2.1 Causes
The rise of GA unions can be attributed to the sometimes bleak economic realities that
face graduate students, both in school and in the job market. For one, graduate students
have been taking longer to complete their degrees (Ehrenberg et al., 2004; U.S. Department
of Education, 2005) and spending more time as graduate assistants (Ehrenberg and Mavros,
1995). Meanwhile, outside monies for financial assistance from the federal government has
decreased (U.S. Department of Education, 2005; Ehrenberg et al., 1993). After graduation,
the outlook is not any more sanguine. Graduate students, particularly in the humanities, are
facing a tighter job market (Aronowitz, 1998; Barba, 1994), universities are cutting back on
the number of tenured faculty positions being offered, and some real wages have fallen (U.S.
Department of Education, 2005). Union gains are also attributable to changing institutional
structures. Legislation permitting unionization and the spread of faculty unions have helped
graduate unions succeed in gaining recognition (Julius and Gumport, 2002).
The time–to–degree—the amount of time it takes to receive a graduate degree after start-
ing the program—has been steadily increasing since the 1970s. Table 1.2 shows the median
time–to–degree between 1978 and 2003 has risen for all disciplines. However, social sciences,
8A number of events can be counted as a formation of the union. These dates usually signi-
fied a success “card signing” drive, an official vote of confidence for a union, or any legal action
(e.g., petition) was recorded. An entire timeline with precise dates and references can be found at
http://tschenk.public.iastate.edu/timeline/timeline.html .
9Seventeen unions have formed but not been formally recognized: Boston University; Brandeis; Brown;
Columbia; Cornell; Indiana; Ohio State; Pennsylvania State; Purdue; Rensselaer; Tufts; Maryland; University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; University of Pennsylvania; University of Southern California; University of
Virginia; and Yale University.
8Table 1.1 Recognized Unions and Important Dates
University Formation Recognized First Contract Membership
University of Wisconsin, Madison 1969 1969 1970 TA
University of Michigan 1975 1975 1975 TA
University of Oregon 1975 1976 1978 TA
State University of New York, Buffalo 1975 1991 1994 TA2
University of Florida 1976 1981 1981 TA & RA
University of South Florida 1981 1981 1981 TA & RA
Florida A & M 1981 1981 1981 TA & RA
University of California, Berkeley 1983 1988 2000 TA
State University of New York, Albany 1984 1991 1994 TA2
State University of New York, Binghamton 1984 1991 1994 TA
State University of New York, Stony Brook 1984 1991 1994 TA
New York University (NYU) 1991 2000 20001 TA & RA
University of Iowa 1993 1996 1996 TA & RA
University of California, San Diego 1992 1999 2000 TA
University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign 1993 2002 2004 TA & RA
University of California, Davis 1993 1999 2000 TA
University of California, Los Angeles 1994 1999 2000 TA
University of California, Santa Barbara 1994 1999 2000 TA
Wayne State University 1997 1998 1999 TA
University of California, Riverside 1997 1999 2000 TA
University of California, Irvine 1998 1999 2000 TA
Temple University 1997 2001 2002 TA & RA
Oregon State University 1999 1999 2000 TA & RA
University of Washington 2000 2003 2003 TA & RA
Michigan State University 2001 2001 2002 TA
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 1971 1991 1991 TA
University of Massachusetts, Lowell 1993 1993 1996 TA & RA
University of Kansas 1995 1995 1995 TA
9Table 1.1 (Continued)
Recognized Unions and Important Dates
University Formation Recognized First Contract Membership
University of Massachusetts, Boston 2000 2000 2001 TA & RA
University of Rhode Island 2001 2003 2003 TA & RA
University of Illinois, Chicago 2004 2004 2006 TA
California State University System 2004 2004 2006 TA
University of California, Merced 2005 2005 2005 TA
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale 2005 2006 2006 TA
University of Illinois, Springfield 2005 2005 2006 TA
Western Michigan University 2005 2005 2006 TA
Source: Various, see http://tschenk.public.iastate.edu/timeline/timeline.html
TA denotes teaching assistants, RA denotes Research Assistants.
1 University refused to renew contract.
2 In 2007, the NLRB declared some research assistants were employees and potentially eligible to unionize (350 NLRB 18, 2007).
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Table 1.2 Median time–to–degree, 1978-2003
Time to degree
Percent change
(in years)
1978 2003
All fields1 6.3 7.5 19.05
Physical sciences 5.9 6.8 15.25
Engineering 5.8 6.9 19.87
Life sciences 5.9 7.0 18.69
Social sciences 6.2 7.8 25.80
Humanities 7.5 9.0 20.00
Education 6.8 8.3 22.05
Source: National Science Foundation 2003, Table 15
1 Includes disciplines not shown here.
education, and the humanities have had the largest percentage increases. This is on top of
their already comparatively high time–to–degree rates from the 1970s. As a result, the stu-
dent faces higher opportunity costs while in graduate school since they must forgo current job
opportunities to finish their studies.
In addition to economic costs, there is also the worry of the pure accounting costs as a grad-
uate student. The share of graduate students being supported by federal funds has declined
(Ehrenberg et al., 1993); meanwhile, the share of graduate students relying on teaching or
research assistantships has increased. The type of assistantships assigned depends on the stu-
dent’s major. For example in 2003, 56.6% of engineering students were supported by research
assistantships, 16.4% by fellowships, and only 8.1% by teaching assistantships. By contrast,
over 32% of the students in the humanities are teaching assistants, 34% were using their own
funds, and only 1.8% held research assistantships (U.S. Department of Education, 2005, see
Table 18).
Debt levels also tend to be higher for those in social sciences and humanities (see Table
1.3). The mean debt levels for graduate students in engineering, for instance, was $7,860 in
2003, while the debt burden for social sciences and humanities averaged $18,083 and $15,152,
respectively. Humanities and social science graduate students are also the least likely to have no
11
debt (39.6% and 36.6%, respetively) and most likely to have incurred debts exceeding $35,001
(21.1% and 28.2%). Further, it appears this debt is primarily accumulated during graduate
school. As undergraduates, future doctoral recpients in the social sciences and humanities have
less than $5,000 in debt and are very likely to have no debt at all.
Graduate assistants are potentially being used as low–cost substitutes for full–time faculty
members, especially for menial tasks avoided by tenured faculty (Julius and Gumport, 2002;
Lafer, 2003). range from $55,000 to $110,000 (U.S. Department of Education, 2005), while
graduate assistants earn roughly $15,000 (see Chapter 2). Table 1.4 shows roughly 14% of
courses in the humanities are taught by teaching assistants. When looking at first year courses
only, the proportion taught by GAs increases to 20%, indicating teaching assistants are more
likely to teach introductory courses rather than upper level undergraduate courses.
Spending time away as a graduate student and working as a teaching assistant does appear
to have adverse effects on time–to–degree figures. When major and other factors are controlled
for, graduate students at Cornell University who served as teaching assistants took longer to
graduate than those on fellowship or research assistantship (Ehrenberg and Mavros, 1995).
Thus, as federal funding for graduate students has decreased, the need for assistantships has
risen, which has contributed to longer and higher opportunity costs of staying in graduate
school. In turn, graduate assistants are using unions as a way argue for higher stipends or
limited workloads.
In addition to the plight of graduate students in school, students are also concerned about
finding jobs after graduation. Graduates in the humanities and the social sciences are facing
a tougher job market than their colleagues. First, universities are decreasing the proportion
of members. In the past decade, the share of tenured faculty has fallen 10 percent, below
50 percent for the first time (see U.S. Department of Education, 2005, Table 242). Second,
humanities doctoral graduates are less likely to participate in the labor market and are less
likely to find work in their field. While unemployment is low for humanities graduates, over
eleven percent are involuntarily employed outside their field—twice the overall average (Table
1.5). Moreover, 84% of humanities graduates participate in the labor market, which is 4%
12
Table 1.3 Debt related to the education of doctorate recipients, 2003
Debt level Total Physical Sciences Engineering Life Sciences Social Sciences Humanities Education
Cumulative debt
Mean $12,478 $8,940 $7,860 $11,478 $18,083 $15,152 $12,834
No debt 50.0% 57.7% 65.6% 50.7% 36.6% 39.6% 51.0%
< $5,000 6.4 7.2 6.1 6.9 5.0 7.3 6.1
$5,001 - $10,000 6.0 6.7 4.5 6.8 6.1 6.7 5.2
$10,001 - $15,001 5.4 5.9 4.0 5.7 5.5 6.8 4.6
$15,001 - $20,000 5.0 5.1 3.7 5.4 5.2 5.9 6.7
$20,001 - $25,000 3.9 3.6 2.7 4.0 4.7 5.2 3.2
$30,001 - $35,000 3.1 2.2 1.9 3.2 4.3 3.8 3.3
$35,001 - $35,000 3.0 2.1 1.6 3.2 4.4 3.6 3.1
$35,001 > 17.2 9.6 9.9 14.1 28.2 21.1 18.9
Debt Share
Graduate 69.24% 57.27% 63.96% 61.26% 74.39% 73.54% 76.30%
Source: National Science Foundation 2003, Table 19
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Table 1.4 Percentage of all undergraduate courses taught in program, by
type of instructional staff
Rank and course type Median of Values1 Anthropology English History Linguistics Philology Philosophy
Full–time tenure track
All undergraduate courses 59.0% 60.4% 42.2% 59.5% 63.5% 51.4 62.8%
Introductory courses 48.1 50.7 25.4 49.0 48.1 34.6 54.7
Full–time non–tenure track
All undergraduate courses 9.4 9.4 15.4 7.2 8.8 14.3 9.3
Introductory courses 11.2 10.0 17.6 9.0 8.5 16.3 11.2
Part–time tenure track
All undergraduate courses 0.9 2.4 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.4 0.9
Introductory courses 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.6
Part–time non–tenure track
All undergraduate courses 19.1 17.6 28.1 19.1 16.2 18.2 18.4
Introductory courses 26.4 22.0 36.6 23.0 13.4 26.7 26.4
Graduate Assistants
All Undergraduate Courses 13.9 10.2 13.9 13.2 17.7 14.7 8.6
Introductory Courses 19.8 16.4 19.9 17.0 29.9 21.3 7.0
Source: American Historical Association 2007, Tables 1, 2A
1 Includes disciplines not shown here.
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Table 1.5 Employment characteristics of doctoral scientists and engineers,
2003
Life Physical Social Engineering
All1 sciences sciences sciences sciences Humanities
Unemployment rate 2.1% 1.8% 2.3% 1.4% 2.7% 1.7%
Out–of–field rate2 5.0 3.8 2.7 2.6 3.5 11.6
Labor force participation 88.5 88.7 86.2 88.1 88.8 84.3
Source: National Science Foundation 2003, Table 28
1Includes other disciplines not shown here.
2Out–of–field rate measures those involuntarily working out of their field.
lower than the overall average. Third, Table 1.6 shows faculty salaries in the humanities has
also fallen since 1987. The average salary for a faculty member in the humanities, in 2004
dollars, has fallen 1.3 percent between 1987 to 2006; meanwhile, salaries for other disciplines
have increased.
The statistical evidence indicates that graduates in the humanities, and to a lesser extent,
social sciences, have been hit hardest by longer graduation times, lower tenure rates, and lower
salaries. At the same time, there is evidence graduate students in the humanities and social
sciences are the instigators of unions. In a survey of attitudes toward graduate–student unions,
an administrator notes, “[t]here is no need [to unionize]. They [in the sciences] have all they
want, high compensation and jobs when they graduate. . . (Julius and Gumport, 2002, p. 202)”
It would not be surprising, then, to suspect that graduate students in the humanities fight
hardest for unionization and receive the highest comparative benefit.10
The catalyst for unionization extends beyond self–interest. Graduate assistants have also
objected to the “corporatization” of universities (Rhoads and Rhoades, 2005; Lafer, 2003).
Universities are able to generate revenue by patenting research and offering distance learning.
Pro-union scholars argue these revenue–generating programs are done in conjunction corpora-
tions and benefit administrators, tenured faculty, and corporations. (Lafer, 2003).
10This does not imply they will have higher wages compared to other departments on the same campus.
Instead, humanities will probably have the largest union–nonunion wage gap when compared to other institu-
tions. There is actually reason to believe that the intra-university standard deviation of wages will decrease
with unionization.
15
Table 1.6 Average base salary of full–time faculty and instructional staff
in degree granting institutions [in 2004–2005 dollars]
Agriculture & Natural Social
home economics Business Education Engineering Health Humanities sciences sciences
1987 - 1988 $65,167 $60,851 $54,468 $70,225 $87,235 $57,053 $64,304 $62,183
2003 - 2004 66,447 76,216 58,801 78,967 92,472 56,313 72,816 66,532
Percent change 2.0% 25.3% 8.0% 12.4% 6.0% -1.3% 13.2% 7.0%
Source: U.S. Department of Education 2005, Table 234
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Another catalyst for graduate–student unionization is legislation that permits unions to
bargain with universities. Faculty unions have also helped graduate assistants establish suc-
cessful unions, often voicing support for graduate–student union efforts (e.g., Fogg, 2004). GA
union drives that occur on campuses with full-time faculty unions have had better success at
achieving recognition than union drives that “go it alone” (Julius and Gumport, 2002).
Graduate-student unions have sought a reduce workloads and improve working conditions.
Namely, they seek stipend increases; fringe benefits for themselves and their families; lower
workloads; additional benefits such as daycare; job security; and an improved grievance process
(Rhoades and Rhoads, 2002; DeCew, 2003). These demands have had some success. The
NYU graduate union, for instance, has secured annual raises of 3.5% and full health benefits
(Smallwood, 2002b). The University of Michigan–Ann Arbor gave their students free daycare
for children of GAs.
1.2.2 Opposition
Opponents to graduate-student unions have argued that graduate assistants are not em-
ployees, but rather, apprentices for future jobs (223 NLRB 57, 1976; 342 NLRB 42, 2004). Uni-
versity administrators, who often vigorously oppose unionization efforts, and faculty members
fear that unions will interfere with faculty-student relationships (Boghossain and Velleman,
2007) or unions will attempt to gain control and negotiate over academic policy (Cavell, 2000).
Lastly, union opponents, including graduate students, are concerned increased benefits will
come at the cost of higher undergraduate tuition or smaller department sizes (DeCew, 2003;
Smallwood, 2002a).
Whether graduate assistants are employees is still the key element in the legal cases pre-
sented to the NLRB and the courts. The NLRB has taken two distinct legal methods of
determining union eligibility. The first focuses on the “primary intention” of graduate assis-
tantships. The second uses a “strict” interpretation of Section 2(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Initial cases involving student unionization (e.g., Adelphi , Cedars–Sinai , and
Cornell), used the “primary intent” test. As noted above, the court determined graduate as-
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sistants were not employees because worked on a condition of their studies and were supervised
by faculty.
The court shifted their legal interpretation beginning with Boston Medical Center case and
carried through to NYU case. The NLRB compared the duties of graduate assistants to the
strict definition of “employee” in Section (2)3 of the NLRA. According to the Act, anyone is
considered an employee with the exception of those (1) who are employed as an agricultural
laborer, (2) in domestic service of any family or person, (3) any individual employed by his
parents or spouse, (4) any individual employed as a supervisor, or (5) any employee of an em-
ployer subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C 151). Since, as the Board argued, graduate
assistants do not fit into any of these exceptions, they were to be considered “employees” In
overturning previous cases that restricted graduate unionization, the Board argued the “pri-
mary intention” interpretation required the court to overlay a subjective interpretation of the
law. A few years later, when the NLRB overturned the NYU ruling, the Board returned to
the original “primary intention” interpretation.
Naturally, the question then becomes, which is the appropriate interpretation? Both the
“primary intent” and “strict interpretation” methodology has been implicitly supported by
Supreme Court rulings. In NYU , the decision noted the Supreme Court had previously ruled
the only exceptions to the term “employee” were those enumerated in the NLRA (NLRB v.
Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85). On the other hand, the Board argued in Brown that
the Supreme Court permitted an open interpretation of statues (FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120), allowing courts to apply their own methodology.
Incidentally, NLRB decisions also corresponded to the political composition of the Board
members. In NYU , the Democrat-majority Board, voting along party lines, permitted union-
ization; meanwhile, the Republican-majority in Brown, again voting along party lines, barred
unionization. Thus, with political party influences and differing legal interpretations, both sup-
ported by the Supreme Court, the NLRB has not settled on a legal definition of “employee”
in the graduate union context.
Second, unions may interfere with faculty-student relationships. Under a union regime,
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tasks are carefully enumerated and grievance processes are outlined. Some faculty and graduate
students claim the role of the mentor will decline and the individual faculty member will be
looked upon as an employer, and not as someone who gives advice (Gehman, 2001; Boghossain
and Velleman, 2007). However, this claim has not been supported in the literature. Case
studies have revealed that faculty members do not perceive their relationship with students
has been inhibited by unions (Hewitt, 2000). In fact, Julius and Gumport (2002) suggest that
carefully enumerating tasks and duties may enhance the mentoring relationship because of
clear expectations given to the students.
Lastly, the economic gains made by graduate-student unions will eventually have some
economic impact on other areas of the university. Increasing stipends, fringe benefits, or
provided other facilities such as daycare, might lead to higher tuition rates for undergraduate
students. Similarly, departments may reduce the number of new students who are accepted
with funding into a unionized department. First, under unionization, graduate students will
be better able to secure more funding and their likelihood to graduate. Second, increased
remunerations may reduce the number of incoming students, thereby potentially reducing the
number of future faculty members and increasing future faculty wages.11
It does not seem to be the case, prima facie, that unionization causes catastrophic in-
creases in tuition or reduces department size. In particular, no one to the author’s knowledge
has blamed unionization at the oldest GA unionized institutions—University of Wisconsin–
Madison and University of Michigan–Ann Arbor—for chronic tuition increases or smaller de-
partment sizes. Of course, a number of factors possibly stronger than unionization has gone
into tuition increases, which does not exclude the possibility of some relationship between
unionization and costs.
11It is possible the labor supply would be unchanged. Departments would be more likely to decline admissions
for those least likely to complete a degree, thus, having no effect on the labor market. See Ehrenberg (1992,
1991) for a further discussion on the flow of new academic labor supply.
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1.3 What Do Unions Do?
Scholars have made a number of points on the implications of graduate–student unions,
none too unfamiliar to other unionization movements. Ultimately, it is desirable to know
what graduate student have done and the net benefit (cost) from unionization. However, the
previous literature spends little or no time discussing the feasibility of unions resolving the
major grievances that led to unionization in the first place.
The recommended goals of graduate–student unionization has been summarized by the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT), who is often affiliated with local graduate union
chapters (Fogg, 2004):
• Graduate assistants should receive a fair salary,
• receive full–tuition waivers,
• and receive health–care and retirement benefits.
• Universities should set clear work expectations,
• provide a fair job evaluation,
• should not reclassify GAs as adjunct professors,
• should provide paid orientations,
• provide academic freedom to graduate assistants,
• permit graduate assistants to serve on departmental committees.
The goals for graduate–student unions are not dissimilar to those made in other industries. It
is reasonable to suspect
Richard Freeman and James Medoff’sWhat Do Unions Do? (1985) presents an empirically–
based framework to view the effects of unionization. Freeman and Medoff introduced the “two
faces of unionization.” The “monopoly face” of unions uses their collective bargaining power to
raise wages. Obviously, higher wages—which would benefit some employees—would raise costs
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for the firm and may reduce overall employment—thereby hurting other employees. On the
other hand, unions also have a “collective voice face”. Unions provide a way to voice employee
concerns to the employer. Collective voice, the authors argue, provide a mechanism to im-
prove economic efficiency by reducing quit rates and improve productivity. Consequently, the
increased economic efficiency can overcome the negative effects for the firm caused by higher
wages (e.g. monopoly face).
Economic efficiency, of course, is not the only concern. The monopoly and collective voice
face have deleterious and beneficial effects of the distribution of income and the social nature
of the organization. Generally, labor unions lower intra-firm variance of wages (Freeman and
Medoff, 1985; Freeman, 1980, Chp. 5), while increasing the wage inequality between union
and nonunion workers. Unions also enhance the social organization of the firm by introducing
democratic procedures to the governance of the firm. These processes, which enhance union
voice, often lowers quit rates among workers (Addison and Belfield, 2004).
Graduate–student unionization is malleable to the framework used by Freeman and Medoff.
Table 1.7 adapts Freeman and Medoff’s orginal figure (1985, Table 1–1) to the issues in graduate
unions which were raised in the preceding section. Graduate unions have already tried to use
their monopoly power to negotiate for better stipends and benefits. The use of collective voice
has also been highlight, and to some extent, studied by scholars. The next three sections will
briefly discuss how the two faces of unionization relates to economic efficiency, distribution of
income, and the social organization on campus.
1.3.1 Economic Efficiency
It is likely unionization has secured some stipend increases, contributing to their popularity.
The monopoly face of unionism is primarily responsible for guaranteeing better stipends and
even union recognition itself. Unionizers have not been afraid to strike, withhold grades, and
occupy buildings. Withholding labor persuaded, if not forces, administrators to bargain. The
positive benefit for graduate students is higher stipends and better benefits. The cost, however,
is likely to be carried over to other students or reduce the number of new acceptances.
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Table 1.7 Monopoly and Collective Voice Faces in Graduate–Student
Unionization
Economic Efficiency Distribution of Income Social Nature
Monopoly Unions will increase stipends Unions will only increase stipends Unions interfere with faculty–student
Face and fringe benefits. for specific students. relationships.
Collective Voice Unions will increase efficiency Unions will lower intra-University Unions will eliminate exploitation
Face by enumerating tasks. stipend variation. of GAs.
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The collective voice face does have a chance to improve economic efficiency. Unions nego-
tiate for better grievance procedures and better work environments which, hypothetically, can
improve work efficiency (Julius and Gumport, 2002). Leaving (quitting) is an important com-
ponent to displaying dissatisfaction for a job (Hirschman, 1970) and is particularly important
since graduate students are tied to the university for more than just employment. Improv-
ing job quality through better procedures can increase productivity and reduce costs for the
university by ensuring a working TA staff.
1.3.2 Distribution of Income
Unions, through the monopoly power, will be in the position to raise stipends and benefits
relative to nonunionized universities. While inequality between union and nonunion universities
will likely rise, the intra–University wage gap will shrink. The collective voice face of unionism
has negotiated for new wage schemes that lowered the variation of wage within the firm.
Similarly, graduate–student unions may also bargain for schemes with the same effect. Namely,
unions may be effective at lowering the variation of wages between the natural sciences and
the social sciences and humanities.
1.3.3 Social Organization
The social nature of union organization is heavily relied upon in the current graduate–
student union literature. The democratic institution within graduate–student unions is often
the pride of union organizers (see Herman and Schmid, 2003). Unions begin with a campus–
wide vote to determine the bargaining union and its officers. Tentative contracts are also vote
upon before being formally accepted. Both officers and contracts are regularly brought to a
vote.
However, unions may be initially ran and organized by non-elected or even non-local mem-
bers. National unions, which have been assisting GA unions, often send their employees to
head campaigns (Breitzer, 2003). Moreover, the classic majority–rule problem may permit
unions to organize, but only because of high turnouts from particular departments. That is,
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some departments may be uninterested in unions and effectively not represented.
1.4 Can Unions Succeed?
The previous section outlined the five main causes of unionization: (1) increased time–to–
degree; (2) high costs; (3) more debt; (4) more but less desirable work and; (5) a tougher job
market. The obvious question is whether can ameliorate the issues that led to unionization.
Undoubtedly, traditional labor unions are effective at increasing wages. Faculty unions have
already been successful at increasing wages in a campus setting (Freeman, 1978; Guthrie-Morse
et al., 1981; Barbezat, 1989). Graduate students, however, are inherently ephemeral, leaving
the union after graduation. The entire union membership often has a 100% turnover at least
once a decade.
The previous section detailed the mechanism, monopoly power and collective voice, that
would be used by the unions to redress their concerns. The monopoly voice will be able to
reduce costs for graduate assistants by bargaining for tuition remission and lowering debt by
increasing salaries. The eventual higher cost of graduate assistants may encourage departments
to enroll fewer graduate students, thereby lowering the future labor supply of faculty and
resolving job market woes. The collective voice face would be able to bargain for more desirable
work and an effective grievance procedure for students being forced to work too much.
However, unionization will unlikely be able to decrease . Unions, if effective, will create
incentives that do not encourage quicker completion. Higher stipends, better health benefits,
and lower debt decreases the opportunity cost of staying in graduate school.
Overall, unionization has the ability to address the complaints given by graduate students.
The monopoly and collective voice faces have the right tools to accomplish their goals. However,
it is not known whether it is actually being achieved by unions. While there are reasons to
suspect unionization can achieve their goals, there are reasons why it may not, such as a high
annual attrition rate.
Studies on the effects of unionization will either implicitly or explicitly address the impact
on economic efficiency, distribution of income, and social organization. Qualitative analysis of
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the effects on social organization has already started (e.g., Hewitt, 2000; Julius and Gumport,
2002), but the quantitative impact on the economic variables is still unclear. In the next
chapter, a study of the economic effects will be undertaken. In particular, the effectiveness of
the monopoly face of unionism in the areas of economic efficiency and distribution of income
(e.g., higher wages, inter-University wage variance, and intra-University wage variance) will be
studied. Later in chapter 3, these findings will be combined with other research to evaluate
the effectiveness of unions.
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CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC EFFECTS
One previous study was able to analyze the economic effects from graduate–student unions.
Graduate stipends are not published regularly to let researchers analyze how unions affect
stipends. This chapter relies on a survey conducted by The Chronicle of Higher Education of
stipends in 2001, 2002, and 2004 makes it possible to begin some analysis.
A study by Ehrenberg et al. (2004)—the only study of graduate-student stipends—showed
graduate–student unions were ineffective at increasing stipends. In a five-year period from
1996 to 2001, stipends at nonunionized universities rose 13.9%, while stipends at unionized
institutions rose 10.7%. However, unionized schools were better able to reduce the amount
of required fees. Total compensation (stipends minues required fees) at unionized schools
increased 18.47% compared to 14.5% for nonunionized institutions, implying graduate unions
were better able to reduce required fees.
Unfortunately, the authors of the study were bounded by strict confidentiality agreements
and were only able to compare averages instead of using traditional econometric analysis.
Thus, it is unclear whether differences between unionized and nonunionized institutions or
other differences between institutions. Moreover, their study was not able to directly compare
health benefits for universities.
Notwithstanding the paucity of research on graduate-assistant stipends, a number of studies
have investigated the economic effects of faculty unionization. The evidence from faculty
unions studies were mixed. A number of studies found faculty with unions had higher salary
and compensation levels relative to nonunionized universities (Freeman, 1978; Birnbaum, 1974,
1976; Barbezat, 1989; Monks, 2000). A handful of other studies found faculty wages had little
or negative effects (Morgan and Kearney, 1977; Marshall, 1979; Guthrie-Morse et al., 1981;
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Rees, 1993; Hosios and Siow, 2004).
Results from the faculty unionization movement provides some indication about graduate–
student unions. Both groups are well–education and work on university campuses with a
department–university organization structure. The main services provided by both are teaching
and research. However, graduate assistants (GAs) also differ in important ways; namely,
GA’s do not have a tenure system. Also, graduate assistantships are short–term employment,
terminated when the student graduates. Because of this, unions face high turn over rates that
may hamper their ability to effectively bargain.
The rest of this chapter will study the economic and income distribution effects of unioniza-
tion outlined in Table 1.7. The central hypotheses tested here, and presumed in the literature,
are that unions increase stipends and health care benefits while lowering the variance of income
within a university.
2.1 Data Set
The data used in this study is collected from a number of sources. Stipend data was
collected by The Chronicle of Higher Education for the 2000-01, 2001-02, and 2003-04 academic
years (Smallwood, 2001, 2004). The Chronicle collected the average stipends at the department
level for teaching assistants (TAs) and research assistants (RAs) in biology, economics, English,
mechanical engineering, and sociology. Additionally, the surveys provided some simple data
on health-care benefits. Universities indicated whether the university paid for health benefits
for graduate assistants and dependents.
Forty-five universities from the Association of American Universities—an accreditation
agency—were observed in the surveys for the 2000-01 and 2001-02 academic years. For the
2003-04 survey, eighty-three “leading universities” were sampled. In total, 101 unique universi-
ties were sampled. Twenty-five universities were included in the 2000-01, 2001-02, and 2003-04
surveys.
Stipend data was then paired to institutional and departmental characteristics for that
given year. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) was used to find
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the type of institution (public or private); the cost–of–living for students attending the univer-
sity; tuition costs; endowment size of the university; and total enrollment. Ranks for academic
departments was obtained from the National Research Council 1995.
Union data was obtained from the Coalition of Graduate Employee Unions (CGEU), news-
papers, and other writings. Union status has been divided into three categories: Contract
union, Noncontract Unions, and No Union. A contract union is a union that has secured a
labor contract. A noncontract union, on the other hand, is one where there is an active union
presence, but they have not secured a contract. Some of the noncontract unions are simply not
permitted to unionize (e.g., NYU), while others have yet to receive recognition. As a result,
these unions have no formal bargaining power. Finally, no union is simply a university without
a labor union.
When there is a contractual union, teaching assistants are always included. However, some
research assistants are not part of a contractual union. Thus, contractual unions have also
been decomposed into two groups, TA union and TA+RA union. TA union only includes
teaching assistants, while TA+RA union included both teaching and research assistant.
Noncontractual unions may strike and protest, but they lack the ability to formally bargain
and sign contracts. Since contractual unions are able to sign legally binding contracts and
can appeal to state labor boards concerning unfair labor practices, they will likely have the
strongest impact on stipends, health benefits, and wage variation. The main negotiating
tool for noncontract unions, however, are strikes since they have no negotiating power, thus,
noncontract unions are likely to have little or no impact on stipends.
A summary of the data is listed in Table 2.1. Roughly 22 percent of departments who
reported TA wages in this sample belong to a union and 29 percent of departments who
reported RA wages are unionized. Ten percent of the sampled universities are noncontract
unions. The mean stipends for nonunion teaching assistants are similar to unionized assistants.
Research assistants at nonunionized universities earn more.
Years organized is the length of time since the date of the first union contract and sub-
tracting it from the observed year. For instance, in the 2001, the years organized for the
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Table 2.1 List of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Averages
Variable TA’s RA’s
Stipends
Stipend (All) $12,881 $13,725
Stipend (Non-union) $12,837 $14,140
Stipend (Covered Unions) $12,858 $12,831
Stipend (Non-covered Unions) $13,178 $14,165
Stipend (TA union) $12,814 $12,831
Stipend (RA union) $13,148 $13,029
Year
2000-01 0.30 0.27
2001-02 0.25 0.21
2003-04 0.44 0.52
Major
Biology 0.19 0.21
Economics 0.18 0.17
English 0.16 0.13
History 0.16 0.12
Mechanical Engineering 0.15 0.22
Union Status
Contract Union 0.22 0.29
Non-contractual Union 0.10 0.09
TA Union 0.27 0.27
TA + RA Union 0.23 0.21
Years Organized1 7.6 7.8
Institutional Data
Rank 44.78 38.44
Private 0.26 0.24
Cost–of–Living $9,115 $9,270
Tuition Cost $10,368 $10,114
Wealth $1,924,673,422 $1,926,659,179
Total Enrollment 21,832 22,247
Numbers represent department–level averages and proportions for TAs and RAs.
1 For unionized universities.
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University of Michigan, which unionized in 2001, is zero. University of Wisconsin, the first
campus to organize, has a value of thirty. The literature suggests one of two effects may be
evident. Unions may garner higher wages as they become older. Unions may witness increasing
returns over time because they become more experienced and effective (e.g. Barbezat, 1989;
Freeman, 1978). Alternatively, unions may initially bargain for union security provisions and
only initially produce small wage gains (Freeman and Kleiner, 1990). Otherwise, unions may
experience decreasing returns over time. Douglas (1930) argued unions initially establish large
wage gains as a show of effectiveness to union members, but focus on other areas in later
contracts.
Key departmental and university characteristics are also likely to affect stipends. First,
universities in high cost–of–living areas will be associated with higher wages. Cost–of–living is
estimated by summing the estimated housing cost and other expenses for off–campus students
(National Science Foundation, 2003). Paradoxically, highly ranked departments pay noticeably
more than lower ranked departments (Smallwood, 2001).1 The rank for each department is
included from the somewhat dated ranking from the National Research Council 1995.2 Finally,
wealthier universities will probably pay more. A wealth-per-student ratio was constructed by
dividing endowment size by total enrollment.
Finally, some graduate assistants may be more productive. Directly measuring produc-
tivity for teaching and research assistants is difficult. Universities typically report graduate
assistants work 20 hours a week, but the figures are usually recommended times and not true
averages. Some GA’s may work more, while others much less. To circumvent this issue, assume
universities are perfectly competitive firms and graduate assistants are in a perfectly compet-
itive labor market. Under these labor market conditions, the price of labor will equal the
marginal product of labor. In a university, the price of labor can be measured by the tuition
1Graduate school can be viewed as a trade off for present earnings with higher future salaries. Presumably,
graduates from highly ranked departments are more likely to be tenured and earn higher salaries. Thus, one
would expect graduate students at the best departments to be paid the least; however, going to a top–ranked
school is a positive sum move. Higher salaries can be explained by department wealth, where rank and wealth
is positively correlated. Additionally, the expected trade-off in temporal earnings implies equivalent lifetime
earnings.
2At the time of publication the National Research Council planned to release updated ranking on February
15, 2008 (Glenn, 2007).
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Figure 2.1 University-Department Hierarchy
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paid by undergraduate students for classes they take. Therefore, undergraduate tuition can be
used to measure the marginal productivity of a graduate assistant.
2.2 Econometric Model
Even though each department independently reports stipend levels, departments within
the same university cannot be assumed to be independent of each other. University policies,
economic characteristics, organizational structure, and informal attitudes universally affect all
departments. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between departments and university. Depart-
ments, while unique, are nested within universities. As a result, stipends within a university
are likely to be correlated. The relationship can be dichotomized into two levels: level 1
are individual departments in a university. Departments are nested within universities (level
2). Departmental stipends are likely to be correlated within each university, even though
inter-university stipends can be distinct. For instance, Emory University reported stipends of
$12,235 for economics, English, history, and sociology, while biology received $19,000. While
there is some distinct characteristics between social science and humanities departments, the
rigid correlation between those departments is likely caused by a university–level policy.
The amount of wage correlation within a university can be measured by the intraclass
correlations coefficient (ICC). A straightforward way of obtaining an is through an F -statistic
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Table 2.2 Analysis of Variance for Stipends
Variation SS DoF MS F
Within Universities 2.5 e+12 97 25,737,783.1 5.28
Between Universities 9.6 e+12 696 4,874,079.40
Total 5.9 e+12 1371 7426133.96
obtained from an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table:
ρicc =
F − 1
F + n˜− 1
,
where F is the F-statistic obtained from an ANOVA table, n˜ is the weighted number of
observations within each university, and p ∈ [−1, 1].
Table 2.2 shows an ANOVA table between clusters of universities and stipends. Within
group mean squared error is lower than between group mean squared error, indicating the
distribution of stipends within universities are narrower than the distribution between univer-
sities. The weighted average number of observations for each university (n˜) is 13.72 so the
intraclass correlation of stipends within universities is 22.7 percent.3
Traditional ordinary least–squares (OLS) techniques cannot be used on data sets with an
intraclass correlation. Specifically, OLS regressions will increase the probability of committing
Type I errors (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998; Barcikowski, 1981) for two reasons. First, the degrees
of freedom in the sample will be inflated. In this chapter, there are 1,372 observed stipend levels
over three years; however, there are only 101 universities in the sample. While it appears there
are N = 1, 372 independent observations, the error terms between departments in the same
university are correlated, violating the OLS assumption that error terms are independent.4
Second, OLS will also underestimate standard errors of the coefficients (Goldstein, 2002, p.
23). Models with inflated degrees of freedom will have a higher critical value, while the lower
standard errors will artificially increase the chance of accepting a coefficient as significant.
3Even though there are only six departments observed, n˜ exceeds six because departments were observed
over three years. This implies each university reported stipends in each department at least twice on average.
4Obviously, correlation is also important for the success of OLS regressions. One solution is to assign a
dummy variable for each university, but using dummy variables will fail to account for “casual heterogeneity.”
See Steenbergen and Jones (2002) for a further discussion on this issue.
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Referring to Figure 2.1, it is clear there are two levels to this data: a lower level consisting
of individual departments and an upper level of universities.5 A two-level random-intercept
multilevel regression model will produce unbiased and consistent estimates with a nested data
set. To build the model, first consider a standard OLS model:
yij = α+
m∑
k=1
βkxk + ǫij (2.1)
where x is the kth random variable for the ith department and jth university, βk is the k
th
regression coefficient, and eij is the error term. The intercept in equation 2.1 is always fixed.
However, the intercepts for individual universities may differ since unobserved university char-
acteristics can change the overall baseline stipend levels. By adding a random variable, uj , for
each university j to allow for a unique intercept, the multilevel model can be written as:
yij = (αi + ui) +
m∑
k=1
βkxk + ǫij. (2.2)
The error terms, ǫij and uj have the following properties:
ui ∼ N(0, σu)
ǫij ∼ N(0, σǫ)
Given these properties and equation (2.2), the following can be derived:
E (yij) = α+
m∑
k=1
βkxk
Var (yij) = σ
2
u + σǫ
Equation (2.2) is used for the remainder of the chapter to estimate the effect unionization
has on stipend levels and health care coverage.6 Dummy variables representing Contract and
Noncontract unions will be used to measure the union–nonunion gap. The dummy variables
TA Union and TA+RA Union will also be used in the multilevel regression regression. A
third model that analyzes the effects of unionization on intra–university wage variances will
use traditional OLS regression. For the regressions in this chapter, the omitted binary variables
are the 2000-01 academic year, biology major, nonunionized and public universities.
5The university system—a university with multiple campuses (e.g., University of California California,
SUNY) could be treated as a level as well; however, of 87 university systems, only five had more than one
campus, an insufficient number for a three-level regression. See 3.2
6See Goldstein (2002) for a more intensive discussion on multilevel models
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Stipends
The first question to be addressed is whether unions are effective at raising stipends. The
dependent variable for the regression, which is based on equation (2.2), is the log of stipends.
Year, major, union status, department rank, private university, cost-of-living, log of tuition
cost, and the ratio of endowment wealth to total enrollment are included as control variables.
Table 2.3 and 2.4 shows the results using two different union controls for teaching and
research assistants, respectively. One regression uses contract union and nonunion contract as
the union control. The other uses TA union, TA+RA union, and contract union. Furthermore,
since years organized is correlated with union status, each regression is ran with and without
the Years Organized variable.
The union wage gap for contractual unions varies between 8 and 24 percent, depending
on the inclusion of the Years Organized and Years Organized Squared variables. The results
imply returns to unionization are initially around 20 percent, but the gap decreases for the
first 19 years. The returns to unionization disappear when unions are about 8.5 years old,
bottom out at 19 years, and positive returns resurface at 30.5 years.
When Years Organized is omitted, the union coefficient drops to around 8 percent. One
possible explanation is the average returns for the nonlinear models (2 and 4) are roughly 8
percent. To test this idea, the Mean Value Theorem for Integrals (Larson et al., 2002, pp.
278-9) can be applied. Model 2 from Table 2.3 indicate the union–nonunion wage gape is
0.23− 0.038t+ 0.001t2, where t is years organized, can be evaluated over the Years Organized
values observed in this study (between 0 and 34 years):
1
34− 0
∫
34
0
(
0.23 − .038x+ .001x2
)
= −.0307
which implies the average returns to unionization is at a negative 3 percent. The major caveat
with this, however, is most unions have formed during the 1990s. Only a handful of universities
unionized before 1990, (see Table 1.1) thus according to these results, most of them are still
earning more compared to nonunion universities.
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Table 2.3 Two-Level Random-Intercept Multilevel Regression on Log of
Stipends for Teaching Assistants
Variable
Contract Union TA and TA+RA Union
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Fixed
2001 0.033† (0.019) 0.037† (0.019) 0.046∗∗ (0.022) 0.044∗∗ (0.022)
2003 0.083∗ (0.028) 0.101∗ (0.027) 0.094∗ (0.030) 0.106∗ (0.029)
Economics -0.034 (0.024) -0.031 (0.024) -0.033 (0.024) -0.031 (0.024)
English -0.046† (0.025) -0.044† (0.024) -0.045† (0.025) -0.044† (0.024)
History -0.069∗ (0.025) -0.069∗ (0.025) -0.070∗ (0.025) -0.069∗ (0.025)
Engineering -0.013 (0.024) -0.012 (0.024) -0.013 (0.024) -0.011 (0.024)
Sociology -0.054∗∗ (0.026) -0.053∗∗ (0.025) -0.053∗∗ (0.025) -0.052∗∗ (0.025)
Annual Pay 0.338∗ (0.031) 0.335∗ (0.030) 0.338∗ (0.031) 0.335∗ (0.030)
Contract Union 0.086∗∗ (0.037) 0.230∗ (0.049)
TA Union 0.122∗∗ (0.048) 0.247∗ (0.055)
TA+RA Union 0.080∗∗ (0.037) 0.224∗ (0.049)
Noncontract Union 0.061 (0.051) 0.070 (0.046) 0.063 (0.050) 0.071 (0.046)
Years Org. -0.038∗ (0.010) -0.037∗ (0.010)
Years Org. Sq. 0.001∗ (3.3e-04) 0.001∗ (3.4e-04)
Rank 2.8e-05 (3.7e-04) 9.4e-05 (3.6e-04) 3.8e-05 (3.8e-04) 9.2e-05 (3.7e-04)
Private 0.110 (0.110) 0.100 (0.103) 0.105 (0.110) 0.098 (0.103)
COLA-Log 0.094 (0.078) 0.098 (0.074) 0.096 (0.078) 0.098 (0.074)
Tuition-Log 0.005 (0.058) 0.002 (0.054) 0.008 (0.058) 0.004 (0.054)
Wealth Ratio -1.7e-09 (5.8e-08) 1.6e-08 (5.4e-08) 5.4e-10 (5.76e-08) 1.6e-08 (5.4e-08)
Intercept 8.421∗ (0.881) 8.394∗ (0.837) 8.367∗ (0.885) 8.375∗ (0.838)
Random
σu (Intercept) 0.106
∗ (0.013) 0.096∗ (0.012) 0.107∗ (0.014) 0.096∗ (0.0124)
σǫ (Model) 0.159
∗ (0.005) 0.158∗ (0.005) 0.159∗ (0.005) 0.158∗ (0.0051)
Observations 558 558 558 558
University Clusters 82 82 82 82
Standard Errors in parenthesis; Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗ ; Models 1 and 3 does not include Years Organized,
while it is included in Models 2 and 4. Omitted variables: 2000, Biology, 9-month pay, nonunion, and public university.
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Figure 2.2 Variation Inflation Factors (VIFs) for Teaching Assistants
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The seemingly apocryphal returns for contractual unions when years organized is included
can be attributed to a large union cohort and econometric problems. All of the universities in
this study were either organized in the 1990s or before 1981. Thus, Years Organized does not
have values between 11 and 19 years and intermittent values between 20 and 34 years.7
Furthermore, Years Organized and union status is correlated since only unionized schools
can have a positive Years Organized value. While this is true for all studies including Years
Organized, past studies worked with much larger data sets. It appears this study, with 558
observations for TAs and 410 for RAs, is inhibited by the correlation. Figure 2.3.1 shows the
variance inflation factors (VIFs) after estimating Model 2 in Table 2.3, and, as expected, the
values for Years Organized and Years Organized Squared are above the threshold. Due to the
interpolation and econometric issues, union estimates with Years Organized are not reliable.
The subsequent discussion and statistical analysis will exclude Years Organized.
7Recall the Years Organized values were calculated over the 2000, 2001, and 2003 academic years.
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Interestingly, returns for unionization are higher for teaching assistants when only teaching
assistants are included in the union. Teaching assistant–only unions earn approximately 2%
more compared to when research assistants are included. Noncontract unions, those which
do not have collective bargaining agreements with the university, do not earn a statistically
significant higher wage than nonunionized universities.
Table 2.4 shows the regression on the Log of Stipends for research assistants. Contrary
to the findings for teaching assistants, contract unions do not help research assistants. Even
when unions are explicitly included in unions (Models 3 and 4) they do not see wage gains.
Unsurprisingly, noncontract unions also do not increase RA stipends. This finding is in line
with the hypothesis that research assistants are not active participants in graduate–student
unions.
The Annual variable indicates wages were received over a 12-month period instead of an
academic year (9-months). If wages were strictly proportional to time worked, stipends for
an Annual worker would be 33% more than over an academic year. For a teaching assistant,
the coefficient is almost exactly 33 percent. For research assistants, the coefficient indicates
stipends are 25% higher; however, the 95% confidence interval includes 33 percent.
The regression outputs also reports estimates of the variation for the random intercept, σu,
and the model’s error term, σǫ, from equation (2.2). The standard deviation of the intercept
indicates the variation in the intercept attributable to unobserved university factors. For
TA’s and RA’s, the random intercept terms are statistically significant. The random intercept
variation is higher for research than teaching assistants, which implies there is more variation
attributable to unobserved university effects for research assistants. One example is certain
universities are better–able to obtain the requisite funding for RAs.
The random intercept variation and model error estimates can also be used to obtain
the intraclass correlation of stipends while holding other factors constant (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2005, p. 37):
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
ǫ
(2.3)
When equation (2.3) is applied to Model 1 for teaching and research assistants, the intraclass
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Table 2.4 Two-Level Random-Intercept Multilevel Regression on Log of
Stipends for Research Assistants
Variable
Contract Union TA and TA+RA Union
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed
2001 0.023 (0.032) 0.032 (0.032) 0.034 (0.035) 0.033 (0.035)
2003 0.093∗∗ (0.046) 0.127∗ (0.049) 0.101∗ (0.048) 0.128∗ (0.049)
Economics -0.168∗ (0.040) -0.164∗ (0.040) -0.168∗∗ (0.040) -0.164∗ (0.040)
English -0.291∗ (0.043) -0.286∗ (0.043) -0.292∗∗ (0.043) -0.286∗ (0.043)
History -0.330∗ (0.043) -0.328∗ (0.043) -0.331∗∗ (0.043) -0.328∗ (0.043)
Engineering -0.156∗ (0.036) -0.152∗ (0.036) -0.156∗∗ (0.036) -0.152∗ (0.036)
Sociology -0.188∗ (0.040) -0.185∗ (0.040) -0.188∗∗ (0.040) -0.185∗ (0.040)
Annual 0.258∗ (0.037) 0.260∗ (0.038) 0.257∗∗ (0.038) 0.260∗ (0.038)
Contract Union -0.028 (0.058) 0.117 (0.085)
TA Union 0.013 (0.080) 0.121 (0.094)
TA+RA Union -0.047 (0.065) 0.115 (0.090)
Noncontract Union 0.032 (0.076) 0.049 (0.078) 0.033 (0.077) 0.049 (0.078)
Years Org. -0.035∗∗ (0.016) -0.035∗∗ (0.017)
Years Org. Sq. 0.001† (0.001) 0.001 (0.006)
Rank -2.2e-04 (0.001) -1.4e-04 (0.001) -2.1e-04 (0.001) -1.4e-04 (0.001)
Private 0.236 (0.175) 0.292 (0.179) 0.219 (0.177) 0.289 (0.182)
COLA-Log -0.073 (0.132) -0.113 (0.134) -0.065 (0.132) -0.112 (0.135)
Tuition Cost-Log -0.042 (0.089) -0.069 (0.091) -0.033 (0.090) -0.068 (0.092)
Wealth Ratio -1.7e-07∗∗ (8.79e-08) -1.7e-07† (8.9e-08) -1.7e-07∗ (8.8e-08) -1.7e-07† (8.87e-08)
Intercept 10.540∗ (1.457) 11.100∗ (1.501) 10.38∗ (1.505) 11.07∗ (1.524)
Random
σu (Intercept) 0.154
∗ (0.021) 0.157∗ (0.021) 0.156∗ (0.0207) 0.157∗ (0.0206)
σǫ (Model) 0.217
∗ (0.009) 0.215∗ (0.008) 0.216∗ (0.0084) 0.215∗ (0.0084)
Observations 410 410 410 410
University Clusters 76 76 76 76
Standard Errors in parenthesis; Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗ ; Models 1 and 3 does not include Years Organized,
while it is included in Models 2 and 4. Omitted variables: 2000, Biology, 9-month pay, nonunion, and public university.
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correlation is 30.77 and 33.5 percent, respectively. These correlations are higher than the 22%
correlation reported earlier (see page 31).
The results from the regression support the earlier asserted notion that science students fare
better than the social sciences and humanities. Teaching assistants in biology and mechanical
engineering earn approximately 5 percent more than TA’s in the humanities and social sciences.
Research assistants in biology earn 15 percent more than engineers, roughly 17 percent more
than social sciences, and 31 percent more than students in the humanities. These results are
consistent with the descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 1. Higher wages may discourage
union popularity among science students.
Finally, stipends are only a portion of remunerations. Unions often bargain for tuition
waivers and reduction of fees. Fortunately, the Chronicle survey for the 2003-04 academic
year provided information on tuition waivers and required fees. The sum of stipends and
tuition wavers equals the student’s total compensation. Subtracting health–care premiums
and required fees from total compensation will equal the net compensation. Unfortunately, the
survey for the 2000-01 and 2001-02 academic year did not include this information, therefore,
the following regression is only a cross-section regression for the 2003–04 academic year.
Table 2.5 shows the output from the two–level, cross–section, random–intercept multilevel
model for total and net compensation. Union status is controlled by Contract and Noncon-
tract Union status.8 Unlike the previous results, the union–nonunion wage gap disappears for
total compensation for teaching assistants. Similarly, unions are not particularly effective at
increasing net compensation compared to nonunion counterparts. Both of these results imply
unions are not comparatively effective at raising fringe benefits, such as tuition remission, or
lowering required fees.
2.3.2 Health Benefits
The data set also contains information related to health benefits for students, spouses, and
their children. By using a binary variable to denote health care coverage, the effectiveness of
8The TA and TA+RA variables were perfectly collinear, thus, were excluded from analysis.
39
Table 2.5 Two-Level Multilevel Regression Log of Total and Net Compen-
sation
Variable
Total Compensation Net Compensation
(TA) (RA) (TA) (RA)
Fixed
Economics -0.110∗∗ (0.033) -0.215∗∗ (0.050) -0.106∗∗ (0.034) -0.219∗∗ (0.051)
English -0.110∗∗ (0.034) -0.245∗∗ (0.056) -0.117∗∗ (0.035) -0.247∗∗ (0.056)
History -0.164∗∗ (0.034) -0.306∗∗ (0.057) -0.164∗∗ (0.036) -0.307∗∗ (0.057)
Engineering -0.127∗∗ (0.034) -0.203∗∗ (0.047) -0.125∗∗ (0.036) -0.205∗∗ (0.048)
Sociology -0.147∗∗ (0.036) -0.266∗∗ (0.052) -0.145∗∗ (0.037) -0.269∗∗ (0.053)
Annual 0.134∗∗ (0.046) 0.121∗ (0.050) 0.139∗∗ (0.048) 0.122∗ (0.051)
Contract Union 0.011 (0.102) -0.037 (0.105) 0.074 (0.133) -0.028 (0.109)
Noncontract Union 0.324 (0.285) 0.331 (0.295) 0.339 (0.377) 0.335 (0.305)
Rank -0.001† (0.001) -0.002∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002∗∗ (0.001)
Private 0.292 (0.253) 0.379 (0.275) 0.585† (0.332) 0.441 (0.284)
COLA-Log -0.491∗ (0.221) -0.586∗∗ (0.226) -0.495† (0.289) -0.590∗ (0.234)
Tuition Cost-Log 0.253† (0.132) 0.199 (0.141) 0.122 (0.173) 0.177 (0.146)
Wealth Ratio 1.5e-07 (1.4e-07) -1.1e-07 (1.5e-07) 1.7e-07 (1.9e-07) -1.1e-07 ( 1.5e-07)
Intercept 12.052∗∗ (2.387) 13.617∗∗ (2.473) 13.113∗∗ (3.118) 13.807∗∗ (2.557)
Random
σu (Intercept) 0.267
∗∗ (0.027) 0.252∗∗ (0.029) 0.356∗∗ (0.036) 0.262∗∗ (0.030)
σǫ (Model) 0.131
∗∗ (0.007) 0.177∗∗ (0.011) 0.136∗∗ (0.007) 0.179∗∗ (0.011)
Observations 231 183 231 183
University Clusters 61 55 61 55
Standard Errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.: ∗∗ ; Omitted variables: 2000, Biology, 9-month pay,
nonunion, and public university.
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unions bargaining for health benefits can be estimated with a logit regression.
Equation (2.4) can be adapted to a binary dependent variable:
yij = Λ
(
αj +
m∑
k=1
βkijxkij + uj + ǫij
)
(2.4)
where y is a binary variable denoting health–benefits (1 = some health benefits) in department
i at university j and Λ is the logit function:9
Λ
(
xT~β
)
≡
ex
T~β
1 + exT~β
The same variables, xk’s, from the previous section are used in this regression.
Health benefits for the student and dependents were measured. Since benefits were observed
at the department level, y=1 indicates health benefits are an option, even though students may
or may not join the plan. Union is controlled by contract union and noncontract unions has
been dropped because it is perfectly correlated with student health. Notwithstanding, the
hypothesis is unionized schools will be more likely to give health benefits to students and
spouses.
Table 2.6 shows the output from the logit regression with student and spouse benefits as
dependent variables. Neither contractual nor noncontractual unions appear to increase the
probability of receiving health–care coverage for students. Similarly, unionized schools are not
associated with a higher probability of receiving benefits for the dependents. High ranked
departments are more likely to offer health insurance for the student, and teaching assistants,
humanities students are slightly less likely to receive health benefits, but neither department
rank nor discipline contributes to dependent health–care coverage.
2.3.3 Wage Variance
The hypothesis in this section is unions, particularly contract unions, lower the distribution
of income between departments. Lowering the variation of stipends within the university has
not been an explicit goal of graduate unions. However, since lower wage variance within a firm
has been observed in other industries (Freeman, 1982; Card et al., 2004) and social science
9See Greene (2007) for the properties of the logit density function.
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Table 2.6 Two-Level Multilevel Logit Regression on Student and Spouse
Health Benefits
Variable
Student Health Dependent Health
(TA) (RA) (TA) (RA)
2001 -0.101 (0.150) -0.083 (0.212) -0.093 (0.115) -0.055 (0.108)
2003 -0.884 (0.809) -1.083 (0.871) -0.729 (0.593) -0.135 (0.598)
Economics -0.632 (0.485) 0.115 (0.513) 0.065 (0.192) 0.860∗ (0.358)
English -1.349∗∗ (0.452) -1.245∗∗ (0.430) -0.061 (0.178) 0.805∗ (0.363)
History -0.782† (0.463) -0.909† (0.513) 0.129 (0.179) 0.623† (0.352)
Engineering -0.611 (0.453) -0.350 (0.378) -0.248 (0.229) 0.224 (0.290)
Sociology -0.536 (0.511) -0.017 (0.494) 0.054 (0.235) 0.693∗ (0.324)
Annual -0.714 (0.736) -0.360 (0.552) -0.226 (0.482) 0.856 (0.523)
Contract Union 0.562 (1.169) 0.201 (1.297) 0.348 (0.684) -0.263 (0.736)
Rank -0.037∗∗ (0.011) -0.032∗∗ (0.009) -0.010 (0.008) -0.012 (0.009)
Private -3.390 (3.877) -3.669 (5.001) -0.368 (1.815) 0.258 (1.801)
COLA-Log 1.298 (1.351) 1.676 (1.867) 1.165 (1.865) 0.769 (1.830)
Tuition Cost-Log 0.927 (2.090) 1.165 (2.483) -0.508 (0.899) -0.706 (0.834)
Wealth Ratio -9.9e-08 (1.3e-07) -1.4e-07† (1.0e-07) 2.4e-08 (1.2e-07) -8.9e-08 (1.4e-07)
Intercept -13.430 (21.748) -7.615 (29.458) -5.958 (19.189) -1.545 (19.209)
Observations 559 413 523 387
Standard Errors in parenthesis; Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗ ; Omitted variables: 2000, Biology, 9-month pay,
nonunion, and public university.
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Table 2.7 Union and Major Interaction Terms for Log of Stipends
Variable (TA) (RA)
Contract*Economics -0.034 (0.050) 0.062 (0.084)
Contract*English -0.026 (0.050) -0.062 (0.085)
Contract*History -0.009 (0.051) -0.064 (0.087)
Contract*Engineering -0.049 (0.054) -0.046 (0.080)
Contract*Sociology -0.020 (0.053) -0.042 (0.083)
Noncontract*Economics -0.220∗∗ (0.076) -0.232∗ (0.118)
Noncontract*English -0.094 (0.080) 0.015 (0.143)
Noncontract*History -0.082 (0.081) 0.059 (0.144)
Noncontract*Engineering -0.017 (0.077) -0.024 (0.119)
Noncontract*Sociology -0.162∗ (0.075) -0.086 (0.111)
Standard Errors in parenthesis.
Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗
Coefficients shown holding year, years organized, department, and university
characters held constant in a two–level random intercept multilevel model.
For full regression results, see page 59.
and humanities studies would benefit from a lower wage variance, the rest of this section will
explore the possibility.
A reduction in overall wage variance would likely be accomplished by lowering the social
science/humanities–to–natural sciences stipend gap. To close the stipend gap, unionization
would have to increase stipends more for social science and humanities departments than en-
gineering or biology. Table 2.7 contains the interaction terms of major and union variables,
holding everything else constant. If the intra–university wage variance shrunk, the interaction
terms for some majors will be positive and significant. However, the results provide no statis-
tical evidence that individual majors earn atypical higher returns from unionization. The fixed
intercept union terms remain significant and relatively close to previous estimate; however, the
interaction terms are not statistically significant.
The distribution of income within universities can be explored through other methods.
An ANOVA table for the log of stipends is presented in Table 2.8. Mean–squared variances
are presented for contractual, noncontractual, and nonunion universities. The mean–squared
variance is a weighted measure of variance within each university. Since the total mean–squared
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Table 2.8 Analysis of Variance on Log of Stipends
Contract Union Noncontract Union Nonunion
Mean–squared Share Mean-squared Share Mean-squared Share
Between
.323 .23 .368 .28 .217 .09
Universities
Within
.057 .15 .065 .15 .049 .18
Universities
Total .073 .38 .078 .43 .062 .27
Total Mean–squared is the sum of between and within university mean–squared error. The share of
variance is equal to the mean–squared error divided total mean–squared.
variance is different for each group, the share of Within University mean–squared variation
indicates the relative variation within each university.
Indeed, the share of within university variation is lowest for contract and non-contract
unions with 15% of the total variation coming from within university variation. Wage vari-
ation for nonunion universities, on the other hand, is larger with 18% of the varation from
within universities. This suggests unions—even those without bargaining power—lower the
distribution of income within universities. Of course, outside factors may be influencing these
results, which are not apparent in the ANOVA table.
To control for other factors, an OLS regression can be used to estimate the marginal effects
on stipend variation. A multilevel model will not be necessary in this regression since stipend
variation will be measured at the university level. Consider,
ln yj = αj +
m∑
k=1
βkjxkj + ǫj (2.5)
where σ (ln yj) is a measure for the dispersion of stipends for the j
th university. The subscript
i has been dropped since the university is the sole unit of observation.
The wage variation is measured by three different coefficients: the standard deviation
of stipends, the coefficient of variation, and the ratio of the lowest wage to highest wage.
Freeman (1982) used the standard deviation of wages to measure wage variance and found
the dispersion generally decreased in unionized companies. Similarly, Hosios and Siow (2004)
used the difference of the log of earnings for faculty professors to measure unions impact on
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wage distribution. This study will also measure wage variation with the standard deviation
of stipends within a university. A large standard deviation indicates the spread of wages is
wide. An alternative measure is the ratio of the lowest average stipend in a university to the
highest stipend. The ratio is strictly between 0 and 1 and can be literally interpreted as the
percentage the lowest paid department makes relative to the highest paid university. Values
close to 1 indicate the dispersion of wages is low. Finally, wage variation is also measured by
the coefficient of variation, which is the mean of stipends divided by the standard deviation.
Larger coefficients imply the dispersion is low.
Table 2.9 shows the results for wage variation. The control variables used in this regression
have differed from previous regressions. The Rank Mean is the mean rank for all departments
within the university as a measure for university quality. The Rank St. Dev. is a measure of
the dispersion of quality within the university since wage variance may be attributable to the
dispersion of human capital. Finally, All Major denotes when all majors within the university
report stipends.
Contract unions, while effective at increasing wages, do not appear to be effective at low-
ering the variation of wages. In all three models, the coefficients for contractual unions are
statistically insignificant. The results for noncontract union are mixed. For the regression
on the standard deviation of wages, the coefficient is positive, indicating wage variance grows.
However, when the coefficient of variation is used, the coefficient is also positive, indicating the
variation is lower. Finally, the coefficent for the Low–to–High ratio is statistically insignificant.
2.4 Summary
Four hypothesis are tested in this chapter: the union-nonunion stipend gap is positive;
union–nonunion gaps for total and net compensation are positive; unions increase the likelihood
of graduate assistants and dependents receiving health care benefits; and unions lower the
intra–university variation of wages.
The results indicate contractual unions are especially effective at inducing higher remuner-
ations and fringe benefits for graduate assistants. Both of these findings contradicts Ehrenberg
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Table 2.9 OLS Regression on Standard Deviation of Stipends, Coefficient
of Variation, and Low–to–High Ratio
Std. Dev. Coeff. of Var. Low–High Ratio
2001 -2.268 (356.356) -0.008 (0.028) 0.018 (0.051)
2003 536.557 (335.521) 0.023 (0.026) -0.056 (0.048)
Rank Mean -5.627 (6.358) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Rank Std. Dev. -19.810 (14.306) -0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002)
Contract Union 212.795 (325.993) 0.018 (0.025) -0.021 (0.047)
Noncontract Union 1147.251∗ (479.766) 0.080∗ (0.037) -0.087 (0.069)
Private 434.274 (335.664) 0.009 (0.026) 0.030 (0.048)
COLA-Log 66.343 (622.100) 0.013 (0.049) -0.074 (0.089)
Wealth Ratio 0.001∗ (0.001) 4.3e-08† (2.4e-08) -7.8e-08† (4.39e-08)
All Major -816.166∗∗ (275.966) -0.058∗∗ (0.022) 0.096∗ (0.040)
Intercept 2192.297 (5627.607) 0.097 (0.440) 1.212 (0.809)
Observations 128 128 128
Adjusted R2 .178 .097 .088
Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.: ∗∗
et al. (2004). Their ability to collectively bargain, file unfair labor practices, and are usually
supported by national organizations, which is ultimately reflected in larger stipends.
Contractual unions received 8% higher stipends for teaching assistants compared to nonunion-
ized schools. Specifically, unions which only included teaching assistants were the most effective
at raising TA wages. However, unions do not increase the total compensation (stipends +
tuition remission) for teaching or research assistants. Similarly, unions do not increase net
compensation. Thus, The biggest union–nonunion gap was net compensation for teaching as-
sistants. Unionized TA’s received a 33% higher net compensation package (total compensation
− required fees) compared to nonunion schools. The results indicate unions are more effective
at lowering required fees for teaching assistants—a salient item in many union negotiations.
The reduction of university fees, on the other hand, could be countered by mandatory unions
dues, which are not accounted for in this study.
A corollary result from the regressions supported an argument made in chapter 1. Natural
science departments pay more than social science and humanities departments. For teaching
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assistants, biology and engineering students earned 5% more than English, history, and sociol-
ogy majors. The difference was even more stark for research assistants where biologists made
roughly 16% more than engineering, economics, and sociology and roughly 32% more than
English and history.
Contractual unions were not effective at bargaining for student health benefits for both
teaching and research assistants. The probability of receiving student health–care benefits and
dependent benefits was not higher for unionized universities.
Finally, a union’s ability to reduce variation of wages not supported in the data analysis.
Social science and humanities students typically earn less than natural science students; how-
ever, the returns to unionization are the same, implying the wage gap remains. An ANOVA
table revealed the within university variation of wages is lower for unionized schools. When a
formal regression was conducted, unionized schools did not lower the ratio of bottom–to–top
salaries.
47
CHAPTER 3. TALLYING THE EFFECTS
The first chapter adapted Freeman and Medoff’s faces of unionism to graduate–student
unions. Unions are able to effect the university in three areas: economic, distribution of
income, and social organization. Unions influence these areas through two mechanisms: the
monopoly face and collective voice face. The monopoly face of unionism withholds the supply
of labor
Little is known about the effectiveness of graduate–student unions. The unions impact in
the aforementioned areas had not been extensively explored, largely due to a lack of data. In
Chapter 2, the unions’ effect on remunerations and distribution of income was explored using
data from The Chronicle of Higher Education and various other sources. Below is a list of
findings from the last chapter:
• Contractual unions increase stipends, but have minimal impact on total and net com-
pensation.
• Unions, if anything, tends to increase the intra–university wage variation.
• Unions do not increase the relative chance of being covered by health benefits for students
or dependents.
In summary, unions are effective at increasing stipend levels compared to nonunionized univer-
sities. In particular, unions with contracts are effective, while noncontractual unions—who do
not have any significant formal bargaining power—do not. While the empirical evidence here
suggests unions help in the economic areas of unionization, the empirical evidence does not
paint a complete picture. The aim of this chapter is to review the empirical literature through
the Freeman–Medoff framework.
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Table 3.1 recasts Freemand and Medoff’s framework presented in chapter 1 with the known
empirical literature. The items included under economic effects and distribution of income were
discussed in the previous chapter. The monopoly voice of graduate–student unions is able to
garner higher wages, lower fees, and health benefits. The union’s monopoly voice is effective
because unions threaten to withhold the supply of labor through labor strikes and “work–
ins.” This result is a correlary from estimates of union wage gains. Moreover, the collective
voice of unionization fails to lower the variance of wages between departments within the same
university, contrary to the hypothesis from the framework and previous literature (Julius and
Gumport, 2002).
A central concern for faculty members is graduate unionization will interfere with faculty–
student relationships. However, a study by Hewitt (2000) concludes faculty members do not feel
unionization inhibits the instruction of graduate students. This is noted under the collective
voice face of unionism, even though unions are only maintaining the status quo. The interesting
hypothesis put forth by Julius and Gumport (2002)—unions will increase productivity because
unions will enumerate responsibilities clearly—has not been tested.
Clearly, the empirical evidence is still limited, although a number of hypotheses were tested
in this paper. Little is known about the collective voice of graduate–student unionization.
Namely, whether unionization is able to improve productivity or improve the social nature is
unknown. Julius and Gumport (2002) suggests unions will be able to boost productivity by
carefully enumerating tasks and expectations.
Unionization is likely to come at a cost, but to whom and the net benefit (cost) is beyond
this study. The high returns to unionization suggests the greater need to look at the cost of
unionization to the universities.
3.1 Resolving Conflicts
Unions certainly effect graduate students, but that does not imply the impact is an im-
provement. One way to measure the quality of the unions effect is to see how unions may be
able to redress the initial causes that led to unionization. Chapter 1 listed the main causes of
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Table 3.1 Empirical Evaluation of Monopoly and Collective Voice in Grad-
uate–student Unionization
Economic Efficiency Distribution of Income Social Nature
Monopoly Unions increase stipends roughly 8%. Unions increase the union–nonunion Faculty members do not
Face wage gap. perceive any difficulties.
Collective Voice Unions have little effect on intra–
Face university stipend variation.
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unionization:
1. longer time–to–degree,
2. high costs of schooling,
3. more debt,
4. more but less desirable work,
5. lower tenure rates
The empirical evidence in the previous chapter indicated unions will be likely be able to reduce
debt by increasing salaries.
Basic economic theory suggests unionization may also be able to increase tenure rates.
When the cost to fund graduate assistants rise, universities will be compelled to lower the
number of new graduate assistants, thereby lowering the future supply of faculty members.
When the current cohort of faculty members leave the labor market, the ratio of available
tenure positions to the supply of faculty will rise.1 However, unionization does not create the
incentive to lower time–to–degree. As graduate assistant stipends increase, the opportunity
cost of staying in graduate school decreases.
Thus, unions will be able to redress most of the initial causes of unionization, which suggests
the quality of unions effects is high for graduate assistants.
3.2 Future Direction
This study is explicitly based on the industrial model of unionism. However, fitting an
industrial model the universities may be invalid. While the goals may be the same (e.g., better
wages and training), Tullock (1994) suggests economic rents for universities may be much
smaller than an industrial setting. Union advocates suggest universities are able to retain
economic rents by using cheaper graduate assistants instead of faculty members. Thus, wage
1Obviously, this analysis strongly depends upon the ceteris paribus assumption.
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gains made by unions will only shrink rents kept by the university. Other scholars, meanwhile,
deny wage surpluses exist and any wage gains will effect of costs for other students.
It is possible, to a greater extent than faculty members, universities enjoy some level of
monoposony. The sunk cost for graduate study is considerable. Graduate assistants generally
do not have the ability to move transfer between programs universities since transferring would
require the graduate student to restart the academic program. The lack of labor mobility may
permit universities to lower wages below marginal productivity. The actual versus optimal wage
difference, contrary to assertions by union leaders, may be incidental and lack true economic
significance. Future studies should attempt to estimate the level, if any, of monoposony power.
An important area to be researched further is the impact collective voice face of unionism
has on productivity. The first crucial step will be to obtain productivity measures for graduate
assistants. If unionism is able to increase productivity, possibly through better procedures,
graduate–student unionization may improve departments. Second, unionization may increase
the academic success of the graduate student by lower the time–to–degree and, by implication,
the opportunity cost of a Ph.D.
The measure for stipends can be improved. First, a proper effective hourly wage would
give a better idea on the compensation received. Regressions that included hourly wage would
be able to account for unions impact on actual hours work, which is likely accounted in con-
tracts. The union–nonunion wage gap may be negatively biased. Unions typically stipulate
the maximum number of workable hours. Thus, the hourly wage for unionized workers may
be higher than nonunion workers.
Second, instead of using average department stipends, individual stipends would be more
informative. This study was only able to analyze interdepartmental wage variance. While
interdepartmental wages seemed to grow with noncontractual unions, intra–department wage
variance may have shrunk. Unfortunately, the data set used in this study is unable to investi-
gate these factors. Future data sets should attempt to use individual–level stipends.
The analysis of total and net compensation levels was only for the 2003-04 academic year.
Other regressions in this study consisted of panel analysis. Unions cannot be said to “cause”
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higher compensation levels without a panel study which compares nonunion and unions wages
at the same university. Outside of experimentation, philosophers and statisticians have recog-
nized the necessity of the passage of time to link cause and effect (Hume, 1740, 1748; Granger,
1980).
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APPENDIX
Statistical Models
The goal of this section is to explore the econometric issues more deeply than the main
body of this research.
Choosing the Correct Model
Ordinary Least–Squares
Chapter 2 of this study argued the (OLS) approach in this data set is inappropriate, but
did not explore the issue more deeply. The issue can be highlighted by an example of two
departments within each ithuniversity (see Wooldridge, 2001, p. 329). For departments 1 and
2, the OLS regressor can be written:
yi1 = x1jβ + Uj + e1j
yi2 = x2jβ + Uj + e2j
where Uj is the unobserved university effect, x is the k × n matrix of variables and β is a
matrix of coefficients. The exogeneity assumption requires e1j and e2j are uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables in both equations. This is unlikely since unobserved effects are likely
to effect both departments.
Using OLS will induce Type I errors for two reasons. First, the degree–of–freedom in the
study will be artificially inflated. Observations at departments within each university, although
appear to be independent, are correlated and should not be considered an “independent”
observation. Since the number of observations would be higher, the critical value for a Z and
t-test, which is a function of the rejection region and number of observations, will also be
54
higher. Second, the standard errors will also be inflated (Goldstein, 2002, p. 23). The problem
of inflated degrees–of–freedom and larger standard errors is illustrated below. Equation (A.1)
assumes the test statistic obtained from βi and the standard error (SE) from an OLS regression
is equal to the critical value for t-statistic at α rejection region and n number of observations.
βi
SEi
= t∗α,n (A.1)
When the standard error spuriously rises, the new test statistic will be less than the “real”
test statistic, such that ˆSEi > SEi. Similarly, the new critical value obtained will be larger,
such that t∗α,n < tˆ
∗
α,n. Combining these effects with equation (A.1) gives,
βi
ˆSEi
<
βi
SEi
= t∗α,n < tˆ
∗
α,n (A.2)
By the transitivity principle, equation (A.2) can be reduced to the unambiguous result that:
βi
ˆSEi
< tˆ∗α,n (A.3)
The conclusion is OLS will cause the coefficient to be rejected when it should be accepted.
While the increase in Type I errors for OLS regressions in nested data sets is more present
for all regressions, it is more pervasive for smaller data sets. In large data sets, tˆ∗α,n is
computationally equivalent to t∗α,n. Nevertheless, only one of the conditions needs to hold to
for (A.3) to hold.
Clustered Robust Errors
An alternative to standard OLS estimates is to use a variant of White’s (1980) robust errors
with an OLS regression. Clustered Robust Errors can control for intraclass correlation (see
page 31). As pointed out above, each individual observation (departments) cannot be treated
as independent. However, each university can be treated as an independent observation.2
Froot (1989) developed a variant of White’s robust errors to account for intraclass correlation.
The robust standard errors will be slightly larger when the intraclass correlation is positive
and smaller when the intraclass correlation is negative.
2Stipends between universities may be correlated if the universities belong to a larger system (e.g., University
of California, State University of New York (SUNY)), but the correlation is likely to be weaker.
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As it turns out, the results for clustered robust errors and the multilevel models is similar.
Tables A.2 and A.3 shows the results for ordinary least–squares, OLS with Clustered Robust
Errors, and a two–level random intercept multilevel regressions for teaching and research assis-
tants.3 The coefficients for OLS and OLS with robust errors are the same, as they should be,
but standard errors are different. The estimates and standard errors are both numerically very
different from the previous two regressions, but their statistical interpretations are largely the
same. Additionally, multilevel regressions provide an estimate of the variation in the intercept.
The distribution of the intercept is able to indicate the variation of stipends due to unobserved
university effects.
Three–level Model
A footnote on page 32 briefly considered and dismissed the possibility of a three-level
multilevel regression. Universities may be nested with larger university systems. For instance
in this data set, University of California at Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Los Angeles, San Diego, and
Santa Barbara are all within the University of California system. The State University of New
York (SUNY), University of Illinois, University of Alabama, and the University of Wisconsin
have multiple schools within the data set.
However, five clusters is unlikely to be sufficient for a third level. As an example, Table
A.4 shows the output of a 3–level regression for teaching assistants. The coefficients are
roughly similar to earlier results, but different nonetheless. A new random variable measures,
σs estimates the variation for unobserved intra–system effects. The intraclass correlation of
stipends for the same university system s and different universities j can be calculated as:4
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
u + σ
2
ǫ
When the calculation is applied to Table A.4, the intraclass correlation is 63.7 percent, which
is larger than the within–university intraclass correlation, 26.9 percent. The issue is many
university “systems” only contain one university, which estimates the within–system correlation
3See Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for the original estimates
4This is a variant of the earlier two–level intraclass correlation given in equation (2.3) on page 36, Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal (see 2005, pp. 224–225)
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Table A.2 Comparison of OLS, Robust Errors, and Multilevel Regressions
for Teaching Assistants
Ordinary Least–Squares OLS with Robust Errors Multilevel Model
Fixed
2001 0.030 (0.022) 0.030∗∗ (0.008) 0.032† (0.019)
2003 0.091∗∗ (0.023) 0.091∗∗ (0.030) 0.079∗∗ (0.028)
Economics -0.048† (0.028) -0.048 (0.045) -0.034 (0.024)
English -0.064∗ (0.028) -0.064 (0.043) -0.045† (0.025)
History -0.085∗∗ (0.029) -0.085† (0.043) -0.070∗∗ (0.025)
Engineering -0.031 (0.028) -0.031 (0.048) -0.014 (0.024)
Sociology -0.064∗ (0.029) -0.064 (0.041) -0.053∗ (0.025)
Annual 0.292∗∗ (0.032) 0.292∗∗ (0.047) 0.339∗∗ (0.031)
Contract Union 0.063∗∗ (0.020) 0.063† (0.035) 0.078∗ (0.036)
Noncontract Union 0.038 (0.029) 0.038 (0.051) 0.049 (0.078)
Rank -0.001∗ (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 2.8e-05 (3.7e-04)
Private 0.024 (0.064) 0.024 (0.082) 0.088 (0.109)
COLA-Log 0.114∗ (0.050) 0.114 (0.088) 0.092 (0.078)
Tuition Cost-Log 0.066† (0.034) 0.066 (0.042) 0.016 (0.057)
Wealth Ratio -5.2e-08∗∗ (3.9e-08) -5.2e-08 (7.82e-08) -1.7e-09 (5.8e-08)
Intercept 7.799∗∗ (0.575) 7.799∗ (0.911) 8.352∗∗ (0.883)
Random
σu (Intercept) 0.107
∗∗ (0.013)
σǫ (Model) 0.159
∗∗ (0.005)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗ ; Omitted variables: 2000, Biology,
9-month pay, nonunion, and public university.
57
Table A.3 Comparison of OLS, Robust Errors, and Multilevel Regressions
for Research Assistants
Ordinary Least–Squares OLS with Robust Errors Multilevel Model
Fixed
2001 0.019 (0.037) 0.019 (0.015) 0.023 (0.032)
2003 0.058 (0.038) 0.058 (0.043) 0.087† (0.046)
Economics -0.167∗∗ (0.045) -0.167∗∗ (0.040) -0.168∗∗ (0.040)
English -0.313∗∗ (0.048) -0.313∗∗ (0.063) -0.292∗∗ (0.043)
History -0.330∗∗ (0.050) -0.330∗∗ (0.071) -0.331∗∗ (0.043)
Engineering -0.166∗∗ (0.041) -0.166∗∗ (0.028) -0.157∗∗ (0.036)
Sociology -0.195∗∗ (0.046) -0.195∗∗ (0.034) -0.188∗∗ (0.040)
Annual 0.243∗∗ (0.035) 0.243∗∗ (0.034) 0.257∗∗ (0.037)
Contract Union -0.022 (0.033) -0.022 (0.046) -0.035 (0.058)
Noncontract Union -0.011 (0.047) -0.011 (0.063) -0.003 (0.085)
Rank -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Private 0.136 (0.110) 0.136 (0.148) 0.216 (0.172)
COLA-Log -0.020 (0.091) -0.020 (0.108) -0.075 (0.132)
Tuition Cost-Log 0.009 (0.057) 0.009 (0.073) -0.032 (0.087)
Wealth Ratio -1.6e-07∗∗ (6.2e-08) -1.6e-07 (1.3e-07) -1.8e-07 (8.8e-08)
Intercept 9.698∗∗ (1.025) 9.698∗∗ (1.312) 10.485∗∗ (1.454)
Random
σu (Intercept) 0.154
∗∗ (0.021)
σǫ (Model) 0.217
∗∗ (0.009)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗ ; Omitted variables: 2000, Biology,
9-month pay, nonunion, and public university.
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Table A.4 Three-level Random-intercept Multilevel Regression
Coefficient (Std. Error)
2001 0.0326 (0.0319)
2003 0.130∗ (0.0485)
Economics -0.164∗ (0.0399)
English -0.286∗ (0.0425)
History -0.328∗ (0.0431)
Engineering -0.152∗ (0.0355)
Sociology -0.185∗ (0.0400)
Annual 0.260∗ (0.0376)
Contract Union 0.126 (0.0841)
Noncontract Union 0.051 (0.0778)
Years Org. -0.0393∗∗ (0.0165)
Years Org. Sq. 0.00112† (0.000578)
Rank -0.000154 (0.000599)
Private 0.293 (0.180)
COLA-Log -0.107 (0.134)
Tuition Cost-Log -0.0703 (0.0916)
Wealth Ratio -1.7e-07† (8.9e-08)
Intercept 11.05∗ (1.500)
σs (System) -2.606
∗∗ (1.16)
σu (University Intercept) -1.969
∗ (0.334)
σǫ (Model) -1.540
∗ (0.0391)
Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†,
5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗ ; Omitted variables: 2000, Biology,
9-month pay, nonunion, and public university.
as unity. Obviously, the intraclass correlation is misleading and overstates the amount of
correlation. Thus, the three-level multilevel regression is inappropriate for this data set.
Omitted Models
In chapter 2, Table 2.7 showed the coefficients of a regression with interaction terms. The
full model was not shown to limit the focus on the interaction terms. Table A.5 shows the
complete output from the regression.
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Table A.5 Union and Major Interaction Terms for Log of Stipends
Variable (TA) (RA)
Fixed
2001 0.033† (0.019) 0.022 (0.032)
2003 0.079∗∗ (0.028) 0.084† (0.046)
Economics -0.007 (0.029) -0.165∗∗ (0.047)
English -0.034 (0.031) -0.277∗∗ (0.054)
History -0.065∗ (0.032) -0.319∗∗ (0.055)
Engineering 0.001 (0.030) -0.147∗∗ (0.043)
Sociology -0.033 (0.033) -0.173∗∗ (0.052)
Annual 0.314∗∗ (0.032) 0.241∗∗ (0.039)
Contract Union 0.099∗ (0.048) -0.014 (0.077)
Noncontract Union 0.127† (0.072) 0.055 (0.107)
Contract*Economics -0.034 (0.050) 0.062 (0.084)
Contract*English -0.026 (0.050) -0.062 (0.085)
Contract*History -0.009 (0.051) -0.064 (0.087)
Contract*Engineering -0.049 (0.054) -0.046 (0.080)
Contract*Sociology -0.020 (0.053) -0.042 (0.083)
Noncontract*Economics -0.220∗∗ (0.076) -0.232∗ (0.118)
Noncontract*English -0.094 (0.080) 0.015 (0.143)
Noncontract*History -0.082 (0.081) 0.059 (0.144)
Noncontract*Engineering -0.017 (0.077) -0.024 (0.119)
Noncontract*Sociology -0.162∗ (0.075) -0.086 (0.111)
Rank -2.8e-05 (3.7e-04) -3.2e-04 (5.9e-04)
Private 0.098 (0.108) 0.221 (0.171)
COLA-Log 0.093 (0.077) -0.080 (0.131)
Tuition Cost-Log 0.013 (0.057) -0.036 (0.086)
Wealth Ratio -3.0e-09 (5.7e-08) -1.8e-07∗ (8.7e-08)
Intercept 8.368∗∗ (0.874) 10.566∗∗ (1.441)
Random
σu (Intercept) 0.106
∗∗ (0.013) 0.153∗∗ (0.021)
σǫ (Model) 0.157
∗∗ (0.005) 0.214∗∗ (0.008)
Observations 558 410
University Clusters 82 76
Standard Errors in parenthesis; Significance levels: 10% Sig.:†, 5% Sig.:∗, 1% Sig.:∗∗
Omitted variables: 2000, Biology, Biology*Noncontract, Biology*Contract, 9-month
pay, nonunion, and public university.
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